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INTRODUCTION
The “public disclosure” jurisdictional bar (PDJB) to the False 
Claims Act (FCA)1 limits federal jurisdiction over qui tam actions.  
The PDJB states in part that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an 
action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allega-
tions or transactions.”2  The purpose of this section is to prevent 
1 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006).  The “public disclosure” jurisdictional bar itself 
is at § 3730(e)(4).  The FCA creates a qui tam action, allowing relators, often called 
whistleblowers, to bring suit on behalf of the government against corporations en-
gaged in fraudulent behavior.  Id. § 3730(b).  The term “qui tam” is a shortening of the 
Latin phrase “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur”—“who as well 
for the king as for himself sues in this matter.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th 
ed. 2004). 
 In addition to creating a right of action, the FCA further encourages whistleblow-
ing through a financial incentive and provides protection against employer retaliation.  
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (“If the Government proceeds with an action brought by a 
[relator], such person shall . . . receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 per-
cent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim.”); id. § 3730(h) (“Any 
employee who is discharged, . . . or in any other manner discriminated against . . . by 
his or her employer because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the em-
ployee or others in furtherance of an action under this section . . . shall be entitled to 
all relief necessary to make the employee whole.”). 
2 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).  The full text of the bar reads, 
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon 
the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or ad-
ministrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Ac-
counting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news me-
dia, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person 
bringing the action is an original source of the information. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  Throughout this Comment, and without loss of accuracy, this 
provision is shortened to exclude the last portion, reading “in a criminal, civil, or ad-
ministrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting 
Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the ac-
tion is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an origi-
nal source of the information.”  While this shortening removes an instance of syntactic 
ambiguity (in the attachment height of the “in” clause, see infra note 63 and accompa-
nying text (describing attachment-height ambiguity)), it is not an important ambiguity 
to this analysis, and the sentence lacks any real semantic meaning if this phrase modi-
fies anything other than “public disclosure.”  Further, the last part of the phrase—
“unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the ac-
tion is an original source of the information”—is a subordinate clause, introduced by 
the subordinating conjunction “unless,” and can be safely ignored for purposes of this 
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“parasitic” lawsuits3—suits brought by individuals who have no real 
connection to the underlying dispute between the government and a 
private contractor that are filed in hopes of reaping a large reward 
under the damage-sharing provision of the FCA.4  However, in giving 
effect to the PDJB, the courts of appeals have split over precisely when 
an action should be considered “based upon” a public disclosure. 
There are two competing interpretations of the PDJB:  The major-
ity of circuits interpret the provision to bar any action supported by 
the same information that has been publicly disclosed.5  The minority 
view gives weight to the source of the information—it requires that 
the action “both depend[] essentially upon publicly disclosed infor-
mation and [be] actually derived from such information.”6  Through 
careful and rigorous analysis of both the statutory language and the 
purpose that it serves, this Comment argues that the minority rule is 
both the only natural reading of the statute and the most effective im-
plementation of congressional intent. 
This Comment first defines the problem clearly.  Part II then con-
siders the statutory text within a rigorous analytic framework adopted 
from the field of linguistics.  As linguistic analysis may be unfamiliar to 
many readers, this Part is accompanied by a discussion of the value of 
linguistics to statutory interpretation and a description of the analyti-
cal model.  Following the textual analysis, the Comment, in Part III, 
examines other, nontextual considerations in interpreting the PDJB.  
analysis. See generally ANDREW RADFORD, TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR 133-37 (1988) 
(discussing subordinating conjunctions and their syntactic role in sentences). 
3  United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, L.L.C., 496 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 
2007) (quoting United States ex rel. Gear v. Emergency Med. Assoc. of Ill., Inc., 436 
F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 2006)), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1246 (2008). 
4 A qui tam plaintiff is entitled to fifteen to twenty-five percent of any proceeds 
resulting from the action or settlement of the claim.  31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). 
5 The opinions adopting the majority rule in each jurisdiction are United States ex 
rel. Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 2005); Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse Anes-
thetists v. Allina Health System Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1045-47 (8th Cir. 2002); United States 
ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 940 (6th Cir. 1997); 
Federal Recovery Services, Inc. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447, 451 (5th Cir. 1995); Cooper v. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 567 (11th Cir. 1994); United States ex 
rel. Springfield Terminal Railway Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 653-55 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United 
States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Technologies Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1158 (2d 
Cir. 1993); Chen-Cheng Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1417 (9th Cir. 1992); United 
States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Industries, Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552-53 (10th Cir. 1992). 
6 Fowler, 496 F.3d at 737 (quoting United States ex rel. Feingold v. AdminaStar 
Fed., Inc., 324 F.3d 492, 497 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also United States ex rel. Siller v. Bec-
ton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1347-50 (4th Cir. 1994) (adopting the minority 
view of the PDJB). 
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The analysis concludes that the minority rule represents both the best 
statutory interpretation and the most sound policy implementation. 
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
This Comment considers actions brought under the FCA by indi-
viduals who have direct, independent knowledge of transactions that 
have been publicly released by another source.  The structure of the 
PDJB is twofold:  first, it establishes those actions over which federal 
jurisdiction is denied,7 and second, it creates exceptions to this denial 
for actions brought by the Attorney General or an “original source” of 
the publicly released information underlying the action.8  At first 
blush, the “original source” exception appears to cover the case of an 
individual who sues on information obtained independently of a pub-
lic release.9  Indeed, the language defining an “original source” pro-
vides further support for this reading:  “‘[O]riginal source’ means an 
individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the informa-
tion on which the allegations are based . . . .”10
Despite the above discussion, there are several reasons to prefer 
treating this Comment’s hypothetical whistleblowers as entirely out-
side the reach of the PDJB, rather than as original source exceptions: 
1.  The statutory language states that the PDJB does not reach 
these actions.  While in many instances the phrasing of the ju-
risdictional bar is quite unclear and ambiguous,11 on this par-
7 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
8 Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B). 
9 But see Aaron P. Silberman & David F. Innis, The Supreme Court Raids the Public 
Disclosure Bar:  Cleaning Up After Rockwell International v. United States, PROCUREMENT 
LAW. (Section of Public Contract Law, ABA, Chicago, Ill.), Summer 2007, at 1, 20 (not-
ing that “whether a relator must have been the catalyst for a public disclosure in order 
to qualify as an original source” is a critical issue left unanswered by the Supreme 
Court in Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397 (2007)).
10 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). 
11 The Supreme Court, in a single opinion regarding the PDJB, has wrestled with 
two separate and unrelated linguistic ambiguities.  First, the court decided that the “al-
legation[s]” of § 3730(e)(4)(B) are separate from the “allegations or transactions” of 
§ 3730(e)(4)(A).  Rockwell Int’l Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1407-08.  Second, the Court ruled 
that “‘information’ in [§ 3730(e)(4)(A)] and [§ 3730(e)(4)(B)] means the same 
thing.” Id. at 1408.  Continuing on, however, the Court found the notion that “‘infor-
mation’ in [§ 3730(e)(4)(A)] refers to the information underlying the publicly dis-
closed allegations or transactions” to be “highly questionable.”  Id.  This interpretation 
of the statute seems tortured—particularly for such an ordinary-meaning proponent as 
Justice Scalia, who authored the opinion—though perhaps not more tortured than the 
language of § 3730(e)(4) itself. 
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ticular point it is clear.  And although the definition of an 
“original source” may include all individuals with independent 
knowledge of facts supporting the action, the analysis need 
not reach that question if the action is not barred by the PDJB 
in the first place. 
2.  The statutory purpose of encouraging whistleblowers to 
come forward is served only when those whistleblowers are ac-
tually able to recover.  By subjecting these actions to “original 
source” jurisprudence, the likelihood of recovery—and there-
fore of whistleblowing—is decreased because whistleblowers 
must meet a heightened requirement at all stages of litiga-
tion.12
3.  Exempting these actions from the PDJB reduces a contrac-
tor’s incentive to strategically disclose damaging information 
in a convoluted form, in order to prevent potentially whistle-
blowing employees from filing suit.13
This Comment therefore proceeds under the assumption that the 
“original source” exception is not the appropriate solution to the 
problem and argues that the PDJB simply does not apply to cases 
where the plaintiff has obtained information independently of the 
public disclosure.14
12 As a jurisdictional provision, the PDJB can be invoked at any time during litiga-
tion.  For example, if a litigant begins a qui tam action based solely on her personal 
and independent knowledge, but determines through discovery—or later—that the 
case turns on information in the public domain and of which she is not an original 
source, her stake in the case is lost.  See id. at 1408-09. 
13 Courts have read the PDJB to bar actions based upon publicly released informa-
tion even where that information is “not readily comprehensible to nonexperts.”  
United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 655 (D.C. Cir. 
1994).  Thus, a contractor could, in theory, strategically design a public release of re-
cords to include inculpatory material, but in such a form that it does not immediately 
appear suspect.  The release, if successful, would remove the possibility of an em-
ployee’s profiting from a qui tam action, but it would not subject the contractor to any 
real risk of exposure. 
14 Some courts have noted a concern that this interpretation eviscerates the utility 
of the “original source” exception.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Minn. Ass’n of Nurse 
Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1045 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The ma-
jority of courts have considered it inconceivable that Congress would have drafted the 
statute so poorly as to have included a provision that could never have any effect.”).  
For a discussion of why this concern is unfounded, see infra note 113 and accompany-
ing text. 
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II. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE
It is perhaps tautological to state that, when one considers the leg-
islative acts of Congress, “the plain language of the enacted text is the 
best indicator of intent.”15  Indeed, whenever an individual speaks, the 
listener’s natural response is to determine the meaning of the speech 
and attribute that meaning to the speaker as her “intent.”  Without 
such a system of assigning meaning and intent, communication would 
be impossible, regardless of whether the speech at issue is spoken in 
conversation or written in the United States Code.  Speech in any 
form is, however, rarely precise enough to yield only one interpreta-
tion, which can make intent quite difficult to find.  On this point, the 
field of linguistics can provide very useful tools to determine when 
language is—or is not—ambiguous.  Employing these tools, one can 
see that, despite the disagreement over its proper interpretation, the 
linguistic interpretation of the PDJB is unambiguously clear. 
This Part considers the so-called plain meaning of the PDJB in a 
novel, systematic way.  Rather than comparing dictionary definitions, 
this approach relies on a model for the technical linguistic analysis of 
statutory language.16  The first section provides a background argu-
ment for why linguistic analysis bears on plain-language statutory in-
terpretation.  The second section lays the foundation for the model, 
which is built on relatively simplified linguistic principles.  The final 
section applies the model to the PDJB’s statutory text, demonstrating 
that the minority rule truly “holds the trump card, the plain-language 
interpretation.”17
A.  Why Linguistic Analysis of the PDJB 
Given the current proclivity of the Court towards “plain meaning” 
interpretation of statutory law,18 and the disarming proposition that 
plain meaning is derived from “common sense,”19 it is perhaps unsur-
15 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 232 (1993). 
16 For a particularly troubling example of dictionary comparisons, see infra note 54. 
17 United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, L.L.C., 496 F.3d 730, 738 (7th Cir. 
2007), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 1246 (2008). 
18 See Note, Looking It Up:  Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1437, 1440-41 (1994) [hereinafter Looking It Up] (identifying the plain-meaning rule as 
one of the “most significant manifestations” of the Supreme Court’s increased focus on 
textualism in statutory interpretation). 
19 See, e.g., Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 89-90 (1823) (“[W]here the 
words of a law . . . have a plain and obvious meaning, all construction, in hostility with 
such meaning, is excluded.  This is . . . a dictate of common sense . . . .”). 
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prising that opinions relying heavily on plain meaning are also heavy 
on intuition and Webster’s Third,20 but light on analytical rigor.21  A 
more rigorous analysis is, however, possible.  Human linguistic intui-
tion is not only susceptible to technical study, but it is actually under-
stood quite well.22  Further, the emphasis on “plain meaning” in the 
context of statutes is misplaced.  Human language is a complex system 
capable of infinite meaning23 and riddled with ambiguity—yet, despite 
this complexity, the speaker’s intended meaning is usually discerned 
by her audience.24  As the context shifts from that of a single speaker 
orating to an audience toward the speech-by-committee model of the 
legislature—where words are written rather than spoken—the ability 
of the audience to discern intent is notably diminished.25  Thus, the 
20 See Looking It Up, supra note 18, at 1438-40 (discussing the Supreme Court’s in-
creased reliance on dictionary definitions in the 1980s and early 1990s). 
21 A November 2008 search of federal case law on Westlaw for [“syntactic theory”] 
returns no results, while [“semantic theory”] returns a single result, which discusses the 
difference between pragmatics and semantics in a footnote.  See Am. Home Prods. 
Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 689 n.13 (3d Cir. 1982).  A more general search for [lin-
guistics /p (“plain meaning” or “ordinary meaning” or “plain language”)] returns only 
three results, of which none actually implements linguistic analysis, and one flatly 
states that “[p]roper construction does not require resort to all possible refinements of 
technical legal linguistics.”  Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 769 (9th Cir. 
1948).  Expanding the query to [linguistic! /p (“plain meaning” or “ordinary mean-
ing” or “plain language”)]—and thereby including many results that use “linguistic” 
colloquially, rather than to refer to the formal study of linguistics—increases the num-
ber of results to 190, but it does not reveal any fuller treatment of the subject.  A typical 
example states that “it is not the responsibility or function of this court to perform lin-
guistic gymnastics.”  St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 
772, 791 n.4 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Alabama v. Mar-
shall, 626 F.2d 366, 369 (5th Cir. 1980)).  The brackets around the search-string ex-
amples above indicate the start and end of search queries, as the quotation marks are 
part of the queries. 
22 For a discussion of just how complex, and how well understood, the problem of 
language intuition is, see RAY JACKENDOFF, PATTERNS IN THE MIND: LANGUAGE AND 
HUMAN NATURE 3-7 (1994). 
23 See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND 71 (enlarged ed. 1972) (“It 
seems clear that we must regard linguistic competence—knowledge of a language—as 
an abstract system underlying behavior, a system constituted by rules that interact to 
determine the form and intrinsic meaning of a potentially infinite number of sen-
tences.”).
24 One interesting exception to this rule is poetry, in which the point is often to 
exploit the ambiguity of language.  See generally SOON PENG SU, LEXICAL AMBIGUITY IN 
POETRY (1994).  However, poetic ambiguity is not typically found in legislation—but 
see Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732 n.4 (2006) (plurality opinion), in which 
Justice Scalia chides Justice Kennedy for reading the Clean Water Act as endorsing a 
“poetic usage of ‘waters.’”  See also infra note 54. 
25 Indeed, at least one linguist has argued that the work done by pragmatics—the 
use of nonword cues, such as tone or physical motion, to convey meaning—must be 
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courts’ ability to intuit “plain meaning” from legislation is strained.  
And if achieving the “correct” reading of complicated language is a 
goal of the legal system, the judiciary ought to consider the technical 
nature of that work and adopt the appropriate tools.  This considera-
tion is no more than is asked of courts in other areas.  For example, 
any court could reasonably intuit how much compensation would be 
appropriate for lost future wages, yet the public—practitioners, juries, 
and observers—insists upon actuarial calculus in reaching enforceable 
judgments.26
The PDJB has been subject to much intuitive linguistic scrutiny by 
the federal courts.  The meanings of many words and phrases—
notably “information,” “allegations,” and “transactions”—have been 
questioned and challenged in the Supreme Court,27 and at least one 
court of appeals has considered the meanings of these terms sepa-
rately.28  This scrutiny, however, has been conducted with no indica-
tion of which analytical method was being imposed.  The existing cir-
cuit split over the interpretation of “based upon” makes the PDJB a 
timely subject for consideration under a linguistic model. 
In the past, academics with formal training in law and linguistics 
have often shied away from the use of linguistics as a decision rule in 
the judicial process.29  Perhaps more to the point, there has been (and 
remains) great concern that judges will—and often do—apply incor-
rect linguistic analysis to the case at hand, making it appear that their 
done by syntax in written speech.  See Richard A. Rhodes, Scope in Discourse:  Pragmatics 
or Syntax?, in COOPERATING WITH WRITTEN TEXTS: THE PRAGMATICS AND COMPREHEN-
SION OF WRITTEN TEXTS 589 (Dieter Stein ed., 1992). 
26 Indeed, the judiciary has become so accustomed to considering economic tes-
timony on lost wages that even extremely speculative testimony has been admitted.  
Consider the following example: 
When calculating the lost wages of a college student who died in a rollover ac-
cident—and whose parents say he planned to become a lawyer—a federal 
judge has ruled that an economic expert witness may be allowed to testify that 
one possible calculation of his lost wages would be premised on a lifelong ca-
reer as a practicing lawyer—possibly up to the age of 89. 
Shannon P. Duffy, Testimony on Lost Wages OK’d in Fatal Accident Case, LEGAL INTELLI-
GENCER, May 10, 2006, at 1. 
27 Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1407-09 (2007). 
28 See United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 653-
54 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (considering the definitions of “allegations” and “transactions” and 
positing an algebraic formula for determining if either exists). 
29 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 178 (1993) (“[W]hen 
judges choose to rely on linguistic argumentation to justify their decisions, incoher-
ence will quickly become the rule . . . .”). 
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decision is grounded in plain meaning when in fact neither intuition 
nor scientific analysis of the text supports the decision.30  This prob-
lem is compounded when the level of “linguistic analysis” performed 
by courts rarely rises above “dictionary shopping.”31  However, the fact 
remains that the Supreme Court is moving in the direction of plain-
meaning analysis.32  Any argument against the use of plain meaning, 
given the Court’s current support for this technique, would be an ex-
ercise in futility.33  One could have made similar arguments against 
judicial reasoning from economics—the other modern social science 
recently given an opportunity to transform judicial thinking—as early 
methods applied by judges were quite crude.34  These early attempts at 
increasing the analytical rigor of judicial decisions have, however, 
produced an entire field of study and a significant increase in judicial 
understanding of economic principles.35
30 Professor Solan refers to this tendency as a “temptation” to avoid writing diffi-
cult decisions.  See id. at 187 (“[I]f judges were to accept a few more of these opportu-
nities [to avoid interpretive difficulties], breaking away from this temptation, I believe 
along with many others that our judicial system would ultimately be well served.”). 
31 See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word:  Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court,
30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 297-300 (1998) (considering the ramifications of judicial use of 
dictionary definitions and the pitfalls of selecting between different dictionaries and 
definitions). 
32 See Looking It Up, supra note 18, at 1440-42. 
33 Indeed, it appears that scholars are recognizing the Court’s devotion to the 
plain-meaning rule and accepting that judges ought to be educated about linguistics, 
rather than advised to avoid it.  See generally LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA,
SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2005) (considering various 
linguistic and psycholinguistic aspects of American criminal law and expressing a desire 
to improve the system by enhancing the understanding of human linguistic ability). 
34 Consider United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(italics added), in which Judge Learned Hand set forth the famous “Learned Hand 
Formula”:  “if the probability be called P ; the injury, L ; and the burden, B ; liability de-
pends upon whether B  is less than L  multiplied by P :  i.e., whether B  < PL .”  This is a 
very crude cost-benefit model and is almost entirely impracticable in most negligence 
cases, yet it proved revolutionary in jurisprudential thought in tort law. 
35 The current state of law and economics is not, however, beyond criticism.  In-
deed, one astute critique—that an economic perspective on law is not necessarily an 
objective perspective—applies with equal force to legal linguistic analysis.  See, e.g., Ugo 
Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law:  A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383, 412 (2003) (“In the United States today, law and eco-
nomics has been finally unseated from the throne of legal objectivity, so that its norma-
tive recipes need a new contingent and local legitimization in order to compete with 
those of a variety of opposite political strategies.”). 
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The strong public sense that judges should uphold the law “as 
written,”36 and not “legislate from the bench,”37 supports the use of 
linguistics as a decision mechanism.  This public pressure can encour-
age judges to rely on incorrect linguistic judgments in order to base a 
decision on a seemingly unassailable premise:  that the judge was de-
ciding not who was right or wrong, but what Congress had actually 
enacted—thus binding the judge’s hand.38  But public sentiment also 
fundamentally supports a rigorous linguistic framework for statutory 
construction.  While formally correct linguistic analysis cannot provide 
resolution to all questions of interpretation, it can provide guidance 
in the way that proper economic analysis provides guidance—by limit-
ing the number of possible outcomes and identifying those that are 
analytically sound. 
A simple example demonstrates why linguistic interpretation can-
not provide an independently conclusive tool in construing statutes.  
Consider a law that provides for no syntactic ambiguity of interpreta-
tion:  “Thou shalt not kill.”39  This law follows a very simple tree struc-
ture40 and allows for only one syntactic reading41:  the subject, “thou,” 
is prohibited from “killing.”  Whether a defendant has violated this 
law will, however, depend upon the semantic and pragmatic interpre-
tation of “kill.”  Will majority and dissenting opinions argue over 
36 Note that in certain cases, however, public opinion is for judicial rewriting of 
the law precisely because the text as written is unambiguously in conflict with the statu-
tory purpose.  The most obvious example of this is the “and/or rule,” by which judges 
may read whichever conjunction actually performs the work intended by the legisla-
ture. See SOLAN, supra note 29, at 45-55 (discussing the and/or rule in depth). 
37 See Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench:  A Definition and a Defense, 11 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 195-97 (2007) (noting the increasing use of the buzz 
phrase “legislating from the bench” in Congress). 
38 As Solan has argued, 
[T]he deck is not only stacked linguistically.  To the extent necessary to 
achieve certain results, technical analysis of the language is abandoned en-
tirely in favor of broad policy considerations.  Perhaps the decisions in all of 
these cases are the best ones possible under the circumstances.  Even if we as-
sume so, the result is reached at the expense of selective use of linguistic 
analysis in such a way as to compromise the analytical integrity of the system 
producing the decisions. 
SOLAN, supra note 29, at 87. 
39 Exodus 20:13 (King James). 
40 For an explanation of tree structures, see infra Part II.B. 
41 This statement is a small fib.  The attachment of the negative “not” to the tree 
may be ambiguous, but not in such a way as to affect the meaning.  That is, the tree 
could connect “not” with “shalt” or with “kill,” but in either structure the overall mean-
ing remains the same. 
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whether the meaning is “to deprive of life:  put to death:  cause the 
death of”42 or “to slaughter . . . for food”?43  Will the putative court 
note the profound lack of restriction of “kill” to the act of ending a 
human life?  It is hard to imagine that the biblical commandment con-
templates extension of the rule beyond the killing of a human—
particularly given the Bible’s earlier grant to man of “dominion over 
the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, 
and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth 
upon the earth.”44  While linguistic analysis can go as far as construing 
the problem as one of defining “kill,” the ultimate resolution of this 
question must come from elsewhere.  Thus, even the simplest case of 
apparent plain meaning must be informed by more than the text pre-
sented.  The overall statutory framework, its stated purpose, and what-
ever else can be gathered of legislative intent must be considered in 
making an informed decision. 
B.  The Model 
In conducting statutory interpretation, the modern Supreme 
Court has shown a propensity toward textualist argument, as exempli-
fied in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s remark that “the plain language of 
the enacted text is the best indicator of intent.”45  At the same time, 
there is no traditional or established judicial framework from which to 
discern plain meaning.  At the outset, there are effectively three op-
tions:  (1) the dictionary approach, (2) the intuitive-meaning ap-
proach, and (3) the analytical-syntax-and-semantics approach. 
The first of these methods is the one used most often by the 
courts—or, rather, it is the method of analysis most often explicitly 
acknowledged by the courts.46  As previously mentioned, the modern 
42 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1242 (2002). 
43 Id.
44 Genesis 1:26 (King James).  Invoking this separate section of the Bible recalls the 
statutory canon that one section of law should not be read to render another section 
superfluous.  This canon is referenced in at least one case dealing with the PDJB, as 
discussed infra note 81. 
45 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 232 (1993). 
46 See Lawrence M. Solan, Finding Ordinary Meaning in the Dictionary, in LANGUAGE 
AND THE LAW 255, 277-78 (Marlyn Robinson ed., 2003) (noting the increasing reliance 
on dictionaries as tools for determining the ordinary meaning of statutory language).  
Note, however, that explicit acknowledgement of a mode of analysis may not indicate 
that it is the true basis for a decision.  See id. at 258 (“[The use of dictionary defini-
tions] stops making sense when the dictionary definition is either more or less precise 
than the word’s ordinary meaning.  When that happens, judicial resort to the diction-
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Supreme Court has markedly increased over previous Courts its cita-
tions to dictionaries.47  The second method, intuitive interpretation, 
is, however, likely the most common method of analysis actually em-
ployed by the Court.  While it is rarely, if ever, explicitly noted, intui-
tive interpretation accounts for the vast majority of how all law—and 
indeed, all speech—is analyzed.  This reliance on intuitive interpreta-
tion is necessary because technical analysis of every phrase, as re-
quired by the dictionary approach, would be impractical. 
The function of speech is to convey meaning, and the purpose of 
codified law is to communicate the rules of society in a knowable 
form.48  The philosophical goal of written law—to provide fixed socie-
tal structure—depends primarily upon the knowability of the law.49
Written law can provide structure only if the law is understood as hav-
ing a particular meaning by those who read it.50  This understood 
meaning, in turn, rests upon the ability of the written law to convey 
meaning through language.51
The importance of intuition to legal-language interpretation 
should not be understated.  It is easy to lose sight of the intuitive na-
ture of language in the midst of cases turning on “precise” lexico-
graphical definitions.  A famous example is President Clinton’s ques-
tioning of the meaning of the word “is” before a grand jury.52  When, 
ary becomes nothing more than a vehicle for masking the exercise of judicial discre-
tion.”). 
47 See Looking It Up, supra note 18, at 1438-39. 
48 Cf. PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 36-40 (1999) (discussing the printing 
press’s role in shifting the foundation for the meaning of English law from common 
understanding to the written text). 
49 See Dolores A. Donovan, Codification in Developing Nations:  Ritual and Symbol in 
Cambodia and Indonesia, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 693, 706-07 (1998) (“[I]t would be diffi-
cult to take issue with Aristotle, Grotius, and Portalis, that the purpose of written law is 
social ordering . . . .” (citing ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 51-52 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 
Random House 1943) (350 B.C.))). 
50 Or, at the very least, the law must be understood by those who enforce it.  The 
adage that “ignorance of the law is no excuse” implies that—so long as the law is un-
derstood by governmental actors—laws can be enforced to police society regardless of 
public awareness.  In an intuitive sense, however, laws are much more effective in so-
cial ordering if the public is aware of their general content ex ante, rather than being 
informed of a legal requirement only during ex post judicial proceedings resulting 
from a lack of social order. 
51 See, e.g., Philip Marshall Brown, The Codification of International Law, 29 AM. J.
INT’L L. 25, 25 (1935) (considering dictionary definitions of “codification” in explain-
ing the value of written law). 
52 Kenneth Starr recounted President Clinton’s testimony in his report to Con-
gress:
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however, attention is not explicitly called to the imprecision and am-
biguities of language, our natural inclination is to accept our linguistic 
intuition at face value.53  The trouble with linguistic intuition, though, 
is that it is highly personal; we have no real way of determining 
whether one person’s interpretation of a phrase or sentence is “cor-
rect” in the sense that it is honestly what the interpreter believes it to 
mean.  Thus, the intuitive meaning of a law is likely to be enforced in 
a case in which there is agreement among the parties as to what the 
law means, and not in cases in which the meaning of the law is con-
tested.54  This proposition is borne out in federal case law.55
It depends on what the meaning of the word “is” is.  If . . . “is” means is and 
never has been, . . . that is one thing.  If it means there is none, that was a 
completely true statement. . . . Now, if someone had asked me on that day, are 
you having any kind of sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky, that is, asked me a 
question in the present tense, I would have said no.  And it would have been 
completely true. 
OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, REFERRAL TO THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES PURSUANT TO TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, § 595(C) n.1091 
(1998), reprinted in THE STARR REPORT: THE FINDINGS OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL 
KENNETH W. STARR ON PRESIDENT CLINTON AND THE LEWINSKY AFFAIR 325 n.1091 
(PublicAffairs 1998). 
53 Our ability to make these intuitive judgments is a matter of considerable study.  
See JACKENDOFF, supra note 22, at 48-49 (analogizing intuitive judgments that a sen-
tence is ungrammatical to intuitive knowledge that certain drawn structures are physi-
cally impossible).  The act of determining a sentence as grammatical or not is known 
as “marking.”
54 It is important to note that, even in an utterly honest society, intuitive interpre-
tation of the law would not resolve every problem.  Ambiguities are prevalent in hu-
man language, such that even if parties agree that different readings are possible, they 
will likely disagree as to whether one or another reading is in fact the law.  Further, the 
mere fact that an individual understands a phrase to have a certain meaning cannot be 
proof that the individual responsible for uttering the phrase intended that meaning.  
Take, for example, the term “waters” in the Clean Water Act, which can be interpreted 
in several ways.  In Rapanos, there was no argument between the various court opinions 
over whether the different Justices’ interpretations were possible, but rather whether 
they were the most appropriate.  One footnote in Justice Scalia’s opinion is of particu-
lar note: 
Justice Kennedy observes that the dictionary approves an alternative, some-
what poetic usage of “waters” as connoting “[a] flood or inundation; as the wa-
ters have fallen. . . .”  It seems to us wholly unreasonable to interpret the stat-
ute as regulating only “floods” and “inundations” rather than traditional 
waterways—and strange to suppose that Congress had waxed Shakespearean 
in the definition section of an otherwise prosaic, indeed downright tedious, 
statute.  The duller and more commonplace meaning is obviously intended. 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732 n.4 (2006) (plurality opinion) (bracketed 
alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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Given the incentives to distort the meaning of legal language, a 
mechanism by which strained or impossible interpretations of lan-
guage can be rejected seems desirable.  Modern linguistic theory, with 
its emphasis on natural understanding, provides such a mechanism.  
There is a wealth of research in linguistics that is founded, essentially, 
upon the immediate reactions of listeners to various sentences as 
“grammatical” or “ungrammatical”—or, more simply, what “sounds 
right.”56  By analyzing sentences deemed grammatical and ungram-
matical, researchers have uncovered patterns in intuitive understand-
ing of language.57  These patterns led to the discovery of rules and 
structures governing human language and have developed into a body 
of knowledge concerning what real-world statements actually mean. 
Perhaps the most important linguistic tool for uncovering the 
meaning of sentences is the syntax tree, which can relate a great deal 
of information regarding the relationships between words in a sen-
tence.58  While the flow of words in speech and on the page is linear, 
linguistic analysis shows that our thought process in interpreting 
speech is hierarchical.59  One can think of the tree as a more evolved 
version of the grade-school sentence diagram.  Each word is assigned a 
category, and connections are drawn between neighboring words in a 
branching structure according to the relationship between the words 
of the sentence.  The resulting structure bears a resemblance to an 
upside-down tree—hence the name.  For example, the phrase “the sky 
is blue” is diagrammed as follows: 
55 For example, the parties in Rockwell International Corp. v. United States agreed that 
“the phrase ‘information on which the allegations are based’ refer[red] to the infor-
mation on which the relator’s allegations are based.”  127 S. Ct. 1397, 1407 (2007).  This 
agreement informed the Court’s acceptance of that reading in the face of structural 
and semantic ambiguity.  Conversely, courts may invent “ambiguity” where none exists.  
See infra note 90 (discussing the Third Circuit’s finding of syntactic ambiguity in the 
FCA jurisdictional bar not because the language is ambiguous, but because the authors 
could have chosen different language). 
56 See JACKENDOFF, supra note 22, at 48-49 (providing examples of how grammati-
cal/ungrammatical linguistic marking works). 
57 See, e.g., ELIZABETH A. COWPER, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO SYNTACTIC THE-
ORY: THE GOVERNMENT-BINDING APPROACH 1-6 (1992). 
58 See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES ch. 4 (12th prtg. 1976) (out-
lining basic phrase structure and tree diagrams).  Alternatively, some modern theorists 
have tried to “flatten” syntactic analysis—though even these methods require a certain 
level of hierarchical tree structuring.  See, e.g., PETER W. CULICOVER & RAY JACKENDOFF,
SIMPLER SYNTAX ch. 4 (2005) (describing a reduced-hierarchy syntax model that re-
tains a good deal of hierarchical structure). 
59 See sources cited supra note 58. 
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Figure 1:  A Simple Sentence Diagram60
D N V Adj. 
The sky is blue. 
The same phrase is represented by the following tree structure: 

















 By determining the hierarchical structure of a text, it is possible to 
determine the various readings that the text might allow.  Put nega-
tively, the tree is often persuasive evidence that a proposed reading is 
not, in fact, possible.  For example, the sentence “Paul served dinner 
to him” cannot mean that Paul served himself dinner, solely because 
the structure of the sentence precludes Paul serving as the antecedent 
of “him.”  To see that only structure can account for this, consider 
that “Paul’s friend served dinner to him” is ambiguous:  the reader 
doesn’t know whether “him” refers to Paul or another male.62
60 In this diagram, the word “the” is marked with a “D” rather than the familiar 
“Art.” for article.  In linguistics literature, words such as “the” are referred to as “de-
terminers” rather than articles.  See, e.g., VICTORIA FROMKIN & ROBERT RODMAN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE 67 (6th ed. 1998) (noting that “the articles the and a/an
[are] part of the class of determiners”). 
61 In the tree, branches are called “nodes” and are labeled with a marker that de-
notes what role the node plays in the cognitive process of determining meaning.  
These markers are derived from the category of the “head” element, which is the 
noun, verb, determiner, adjective, etc., that, in English, is the upper-leftmost element 
in the node.  Thus, “IP” stands for “inflection phrase”; “I” stand for inflection; “DP” 
stands for “determiner phrase”; “NP” stands for “noun phrase”; “VP” stands for “verb 
phrase”; PST stands for “past tense” (in this figure, marked with a negative sign to de-
note present tense); and “AP” stands for “adjective phrase.”  The prime notation indi-
cates an intermediary node.  In later diagrams, “PP” stands for “prepositional phrase,” 
and “OrP” stands for “‘or’ phrase.” 
62 See generally COWPER, supra note 57, at 152-55 (developing binding theory, which 
describes the licensing of pronouns and their coreferents). 
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For slightly more complex sentences, the syntax trees may reveal 
structural ambiguities.  In these cases, the syntax tree is not unique, but 
rather may take one of two or more forms.  For example, consider the 
sentence “Sherlock saw the man using binoculars.”63  Without further 
context, this sentence may mean that Sherlock witnessed a man who 
was using binoculars, or that Sherlock himself used binoculars to spy 
on the man.  The following two trees illustrate each case: 












































63 This example, and the analysis of its structural ambiguity, is borrowed from 
Tamina Stephenson, 24.900 Mini-Lecture on Semantics 1 (Mar. 14, 2004), http:// 
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As the syntax trees show, the ambiguity arises from the location of 
the attachment of the phrase “using binoculars” to the tree.  Figure 3 
illustrates that in the lower position, attached to the noun phrase 
(NP), “using binoculars” modifies “the man.”  Figure 4 illustrates, 
however, that in the higher position, attached to the verb phrase (VP), 
“using binoculars” modifies “Sherlock.”64  The ambiguity therefore 
does not arise from any variation in the meaning of “using binoculars,” 
but rather from the structure of the phrase itself.
In addition to the syntax tree, formal linguistics has produced a 
functional tool for dealing more directly with the meaning of individ-
ual words and phrases.  Treating words as “functions,” linguistics has 
adopted the lambda calculus from formal logic as a tool for describing 
meanings of words and phrases as functional forms.65  Combined with 
a hierarchical understanding of sentence structure, lambda calculus 
allows for thorough analysis of the meaning of phrases and sentences. 
The accepted tools of formal linguistic analysis have proved valu-
able to the study of human language,66 and they can be valuable tools 
for the interpretation of the law.  Their integration into legal dis-
course is likely to increase understanding of the law, particularly in 
the context of plain-meaning analysis.  In the judicial context, they 
may be viewed as analogous, in some respects, to the so-called “deci-
sion rules” that some scholars argue the Supreme Court employs in its 
constitutional analysis.67  These decision rules are concrete, practica-
ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Linguistics-and-Philosophy/24-900Spring-2005 (follow link 
starting “1BB”; then follow “0” link; then follow “sem lecture.pdf” link). 
64 In a traditional grammatical sense, “using binoculars” here serves as an adverb, 
and therefore could be said to “modify” the verb “saw.”  In a semantic sense, however, 
“saw” cannot be modified by “using binoculars,” because a non-entity cannot actually 
“use binoculars.”  The reader must interpret that Sherlock is the individual using bin-
oculars, thus “using binoculars” is correctly understood as modifying “Sherlock.”  Cf.
id. at 4-5. 
65 See, e.g., RONNIE CANN, FORMAL SEMANTICS 115-126 (1993) (explaining the use 
of lambda calculus in formal semantics); GENNARO CHIERCHIA & SALLY MCCONNELL-
GINET, MEANING AND GRAMMAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO SEMANTICS ch. 7 (1990) (ex-
plaining the use of lambda abstraction in natural-language semantics).  A full discus-
sion of lambda calculus is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
66 To see how linguistic tools have changed in the recent past, while producing 
valuable insights in all incarnations, compare CHOMSKY, supra note 58, at 26-33, with 
CULICOVER & JACKENDOFF, supra note 58, at 108-48. 
67 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 167 
(2004) (outlining the “decision rules” model of constitutional theory, which argues 
that the rules used to make decisions are separate from the underlying “operative 
propositions” of the Constitution). 
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ble rules that seek to put the abstract “operative propositions”68 of the 
Constitution into effect—for example, applying “strict scrutiny” (a de-
cision rule) as a means to give effect to “equal protection” (an opera-
tive proposition).69  Just as decision rules cannot precisely track opera-
tive propositions70—for the simple reason that the rules have to be 
practical, while propositions preserve a more abstract notion of juris-
prudence—the linguistic tools available to study human language do 
not necessarily describe human language faculties with complete ac-
curacy.  This lack of precise fit is not an impediment to the use of the 
model; rather, it is an admonishment to remember that the model is 
not necessarily reality.  As with any tool, linguistic analysis should be 
seen as one factor in statutory construction, and not the entirety of 
the process.71
C.  Application of the Model to the PDJB 
Having established a rigorous framework from which to deter-
mine the meaning of the PDJB, it is now possible to consider the mer-
its of the rules proposed to interpret the law.  The PDJB states that 
“[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section 
based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions.”72
The majority of courts interpret this to mean that the action is sup-
ported by the same information that has been disclosed.73  The minor-
ity rule requires that, in addition to satisfying the majority rule, the ac-
tion be “actually derived from such information.”74  The Seventh 
Circuit, in deciding Fowler, claimed that its minority interpretation of 
68 Id. at 9. 
69 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification:  How the Law Becomes What the 
Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1676-80 (2005). 
70 See id. at 1658-67 (providing factors that contribute to divergence between op-
erative principles and decision rules). 
71 Though Professor Solan would generally have judges avoid linguistic arguments 
altogether, his analysis of the “and/or rule” shows an acceptance that linguistic phe-
nomena play a real role in understanding the law.  See SOLAN, supra note 29, at 53-55.  
For an explanation of how linguistic analysis—and, by extension, “plain meaning”—
cannot provide full answers in virtually any case, see supra notes 39-44 and accompa-
nying text. 
72 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006). 
73 For a full list of opinions adopting this rule, see supra note 5. 
74 United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, L.L.C., 496 F.3d 730, 737 (7th Cir. 
2007) (quoting United States ex rel. Feingold v. AdminaStar Fed., Inc., 324 F.3d 492, 
497 (7th Cir. 2003)), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1246 (2008). 
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the FCA jurisdictional bar, also adopted by the Fourth Circuit,75
“holds the trump card, the plain language interpretation.”76  As pre-
sented in Fowler, this claim bears no support beyond its bald assertion.  
The goal of this section is to provide the Seventh Circuit’s missing lin-
guistic analysis, which ultimately supports its assertion.  This analysis 
requires two steps:  first, a semantic construction of the phrase “based 
upon” to discern its correct meaning, and second, a construction of 
the phrase’s syntactic structure in order to identify each element’s 
role and its relation to each other element. 
1.  Determining the Semantic Content of “Based Upon” 
Beginning with the phrase “based upon,” the most natural instinct 
of a reviewing court would of course be to look up the contested 
phrase in a dictionary.77  Interestingly, Black’s Law Dictionary provides a 
legal definition for the phrase “based on” in the realm of copyright 
law:  “Derived from, and therefore similar to, an earlier work.”78 Web-
ster’s Third New International Dictionary provides the following, which is 
of little help:  “to use as a base or basis for . . . used with on or upon.”79
“Base”—the noun—is, in turn, defined as “foundation,” among other 
75 See United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1349 (4th 
Cir. 1994) (“[W]e hold that [qui tam plaintiff] Siller’s action was only ‘based upon’ the 
disclosures in the SSI lawsuit if Siller actually derived his allegations against [defen-
dant] BD from the SSI complaint.”). 
76 Fowler, 496 F.3d at 738; see also Siller, 21 F.3d at 1349 (“We are unfamiliar with 
any usage, let alone a common one or a dictionary definition, that suggests that ‘based 
upon’ can mean ‘supported by.’  [We prefer] the plain meaning of the words enacted 
by Congress over our sister Circuits’ as-yet unconsidered assumptions as to the mean-
ing of those words . . . .”). 
77 See Cler v. Ill. Educ. Ass’n, 423 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e will ‘fre-
quently look to dictionaries to determine the plain meaning of words.’” (quoting Sand-
ers v. Jackson, 209 F.3d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 2000))); Thompson v. Goetzmann, 337 
F.3d 489, 497 n.20 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Dictionaries are a principle source for ascertain-
ing the ordinary meaning of statutory language.”); CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint 
Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1223 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]o determine the common usage or 
ordinary meaning of a term, courts often turn to dictionary definitions for guidance.”); 
Looking It Up, supra note 18, at 1438-40 (noting the Supreme Court’s increasing reli-
ance on dictionaries). 
78 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 160 (8th ed. 2004).  Interestingly, this definition is 
directly supportive of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits’ minority rule—more so, even, 
than the Webster’s definition. 
79 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 180 (2002).  Interestingly, 
The Chicago Manual of Style prefers not to use “upon” with “based.”  THE CHICAGO 
MANUAL OF STYLE ¶ 5.209 (15th ed. 2003).  We can safely assume, however, that this 
stylistic preference does not lend a difference in interpretation to the phrase. 
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entries.80  This is, however, precisely where intuition would guide the 
court in any event.  This definition does no work in determining 
whether a lawsuit brought by a qui tam litigant can be heard.  The 
court already knows that the question is one of the foundational in-
formation supporting the claim; what it does not know is when that 
information supports a claim and when it does not.  Indeed, the prob-
lem seems to stem from whether it is linguistically correct to look past 
“public disclosure of” and jump straight to “allegations or transac-
tions” in determining what the action is “based upon.”81
The point of this investigation is to underscore that the circuit 
split is not so much a question of the meaning of “based upon” as it is 
of the function that this well-understood phrase plays in a larger con-
text.  Thus, the question of “plain meaning” must be a deeper issue 
than can be resolved by simple dictionary definitions.  The Seventh 
and Fourth Circuits are adamant in their position that “plain mean-
ing” supports their view, but the dictionary alone has not borne this out. 
All is not lost for this small phrase, however.  It will be helpful, 
once we have the full hierarchical structure of the larger phrases 
worked out, to be able to plug the structure into a function that can 
tell us the meaning of the phrase. This analysis assumes the “derived 
from” definition, which is supported directly by the Seventh82 and 
Fourth Circuits,83 and noted with some approval even by courts adopt-
80 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 180 (2002). 
81 For an argument that this jump to “allegations or transactions” is indeed 
proper, see Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health System Corp., 276 F.3d 
1032, 1044-47 (8th Cir. 2002).  The Eighth Circuit acknowledges that the wording of 
the statute directly implies the Fourth and Seventh Circuits’ reading, but it argues that 
the wording is simply inartful—while simultaneously arguing that it is “inconceivable 
that Congress would have drafted the statute so poorly as to have included a provision 
that could never have any effect.”  Id. at 1045.  Here, the court is referring to the con-
cern that reading the bar as banning only actions derived from public disclosures would 
render the original-source provision useless.  Id.  The reasoning assumes that the 
original source’s action will (allegedly) always be based on the underlying information, 
not the actual public disclosure.  Id.  This interpretation suffers from a narrowness of 
vision—it assumes that if an action is derived directly from a set of facts, it cannot also 
be derived from the public release of those facts.  However, the case itself likely con-
cerns the precise allegations released publicly by the litigant, thereby making the basis 
of the case the allegations themselves, as well as the facts that support them. 
82 See United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, L.L.C., 496 F.3d 730, 736-39 (7th 
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1246 (2008). 
83 See United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1347-49 
(4th Cir. 1994). 
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ing the majority rule, notably the Eighth84 and Third85 Circuits.  
Adopting this definition, we can formulate a lambda-calculus function 
for “based upon” in the following way: 
||based upon|| = { (X,Y): X is derived from Y }
That is, “based upon” is a function that takes two arguments—one 
that is to the left of “based upon” in the sentence (X), and one to the 
right (Y)—and returns the set of all possible worlds in which the ar-
gument to the left is derived from the argument to the right.  The fol-
lowing tree structures will determine what can be the left- and right-
hand arguments for “based upon.”  The analysis begins with the right-
hand argument, as that is the portion of the PDJB that has created the 
most controversy. 
2.  Building the Syntactic Structure 
a.  The Right-Hand Argument of “Based Upon” 
To begin studying a phrase—and derive the hierarchical struc-
ture—it is helpful to break the phrase down into “constituent 
phrases.”  Constituent phrases are segments of sentences that can be 
naturally spoken independently from the sentence while retaining 
their meaning.86  Thus, the language of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) 
relevant to the circuit split can be productively broken down into the 
three following constituent phrases: 
1.  “allegations or transactions”; 
2.  “the public disclosure of allegations or transactions”; and 
3.  “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transac-
tions.”
84 See Minn. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1045-46.  The Eighth Circuit also 
notes that “[t]he split of authority is not quite as lopsided as it seems, for the issue has 
provoked spirited disagreements in some circuits that have adopted the majority view.”  
Id. at 1045 n.8. 
85 See United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth., 186 F.3d 376, 385-86 (3d Cir. 
1999) (“[A] relator’s action is ‘based upon’ a public disclosure of allegations only 
where the relator has actually derived from that disclosure the allegations upon which 
his qui tam action is based.”). 
86 See, e.g., FROMKIN & RODMAN, supra note 60, at 112 (discussing constituent 
phrases as evidence of hierarchical structure). 
944 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 923
These three phrases will frame the analysis of the “plain meaning” 
of the FCA jurisdictional bar.  Tellingly, the phrase “based upon,” 
standing alone, is not an independently meaningful phrase, which 
further confirms that the semantic definition, above, of “based upon” 
as a function is correct—as a function, its meaning depends on its 
context. 
i.  “Allegations or Transactions” 
The “allegations or transactions” mentioned in the PDJB consti-
tutes the smallest independently understandable phrase in the bar.  
The meaning of “allegations or transactions” does not depend on the 
immediate context of the sentence, but rather on the context of the 
statute as a whole and on court decisions interpreting it.87  The precise 
meaning of “allegations or transactions” is not particularly relevant to 
this inquiry, as our question is whether the PDJB precludes actions 
“based upon” the “allegations or transactions” themselves or their 
“public disclosure.” 
For reasons of space, this analysis will ignore any internal structure 
to the “or” construction in this phrase.  The entire phrase will be con-
sidered an OrP (for “‘or’ phrase”), and the existence of a more com-
plicated internal structure will be marked by a closed triangular 
branch between the phrase and the elements, as shown below.88
Figure 5:  Tree Structure of “Allegations or Transactions” 
OrP
allegations or transactions 
. . . 
ii.  “The Public Disclosure of Allegations or Transactions” 
Expanding our view of the statute slightly to include the noun 
“the public disclosure,” the meaning starts to crystallize.  To illustrate 
this phenomenon visually, consider the following tree representation: 
87 See cases cited supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
88 See RADFORD, supra note 2, at 54 (“[I]t is quite common to use a ‘triangle’ to 
represent constituents with a complex internal structure that you don’t choose to rep-
resent.”).
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Figure 6:  Tree Structure of “the Public Disclosure of 














allegations or transactions 
Figure 6 shows the hierarchical relationship between the noun, 
“disclosure,” and the prepositional phrase, “of allegations or transac-
tions.”  In linguistic terms, the prepositional phrase is a “complement” 
to the noun phrase, and its contribution to the sentence is encapsu-
lated in its relationship to the noun phrase.89  Here, “of allegations or 
transactions” singles out those particular public disclosures that con-
cern the reader.  This point may seem obvious, but it is nevertheless 
essential to a proper interpretation of the statutory language. 
iii.  “Based Upon the Public Disclosure of Allegations or Transactions” 
 Finally, Figure 7 below shows the tree structure for the largest 
constituent phrase, “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or 
transactions.”  As Figure 7 illustrates, the structure continues upward 
hierarchically.  The structure makes clear that the adjective “based” 
takes a prepositional phrase as its object, here headed by “upon.”  
This prepositional phrase in turn takes an object, in this case “the 
public disclosure of allegations or transactions.”  Simplifying slightly, 
the phrase “based upon” takes an object, which here consists of a 
certain subset of “public disclosures,” relating to “allegations or 
transactions.” 
89 See id. at 175-79 (developing the notion of “complements” and differentiating 
between complements and “adjuncts”—a fascinating distinction, but one that does not 
bear on this analysis). 
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Figure 6:  Tree Structure of “Based Upon the Public Disclosure of 




















allegations or transactions 
The tree structure of the PDJB further reveals that the phrase 
leaves no room for structural ambiguity.  Importantly, it is impossible 
for the phrase “allegations or transactions” to attach higher than 
“public disclosure,” which therefore precludes a reading in which 
“based upon” takes “allegations or transactions” as its object, bypassing 
“public disclosure” or relegating it to an adjectival role.90
b.  The Left-Hand Argument of “Based Upon” 
Interestingly, there are a few instances of structural ambiguity in 
the PDJB—two attachment-height ambiguities similar to the ambiguity 
90 An interesting criticism of this conclusion comes from the Third Circuit: 
In light of this apparent lack of precision, we are hesitant to attach too much 
significance to a fine parsing of the syntax of § 3730(e)(4)(A).  We find Sec-
tion 3730(e)(4)(A) to be syntactically ambiguous because we are uncertain 
that the drafters of that provision focused on the difference in precise usage 
between, on the one hand, a suit based upon a public disclosure of an allega-
tion or transaction and, on the other, a suit based upon an allegation or 
transaction and that has been publicly disclosed. 
Mistick, 186 F.3d at 388.  While the Third Circuit’s criticism is on point with this Com-
ment’s analysis, it is somewhat questionable, as it finds ambiguity not because of any 
actual syntactic ambiguity, but because the drafters could have chosen an alternative 
syntax.  This argument is contradictory:  given the option between two unambiguous 
syntactic expressions, even a careless choice of one over another should be considered 
a resolution of the supposed ambiguity. 
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in the “Sherlock” example discussed above,91 one of which relates to 
the intuitively unambiguous left-hand argument of “based upon.”  
These ambiguities regard the attachment of the phrases “under this 
section” and “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or trans-
actions.”  The former is irrelevant to this discussion,92 but the latter 
directly relates to the phrase in question, and creates some potential 
confusion as to what the left-hand argument of “based upon” is. 
 Recall that the PDJB states that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction 
over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of 
allegations or transactions.”93  As can be seen in the following two 
trees, it is syntactically unclear whether the “based upon” phrase 
modifies “jurisdiction” or “action”—that is, whether it is the basis of 
the jurisdiction or the basis of the action that is in question. 
 This ambiguity serves to highlight the importance of considering 
more than just “plain meaning” in construing statutes because, the 
structural ambiguity notwithstanding, the “based upon” phrase is not 
a confusing aspect of the sentence.  The “action” in the PDJB is un-
contestedly interpreted as being modified by the “based upon” phrase.  
This uniform interpretation is linguistically explainable.  The phrase 
“an action based upon” (or, as here, “an action under this section 
based upon”) may be a legal idiom,94 or it may be that “jurisdiction 
based upon the public disclosure” is so intuitively unlikely to be the 
intent of the “speaker” from the lawyer’s or judge’s position that it is 
discarded.  But neither account offers further insight into the mean-
ing of the law. 
91 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
92 The ambiguity is whether “under this section” modifies “action” or “shall have 
jurisdiction.”  For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that it is the action that 
arises under this section, as jurisdiction is already provided by federal question jurisdic-
tion unless specifically revoked. 
93 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006). 
94 I am indebted to Professor David Pesetsky for pointing out this possibility.  It is 
possible that in this idiomatic sense, the idiom “an action based upon” could actually 
carry the meaning “an action supported by,” and thereby make some sense of the 
Tenth Circuit’s declaration that “based upon” is understood to mean “supported by.”  
United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552 (10th Cir. 
1992); see also infra note 109 and accompanying text.  This explanation does not fit, 
however, with the Tenth Circuit’s claim that its interpretation of “based upon” is the 
“common usage.”  Precision Co., 971 F.2d at 552.  Regardless, the use of “an action 
based upon” as a legal idiom may warrant further investigation, though it is beyond the 
scope of this Comment.  For a discussion of idioms and their importance to the devel-
opment of linguistic theory, see RADFORD, supra note 2, at 319-20. 
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Figure 7:  Tree Structure No. 1 of PDJB, “Action Based Upon” 
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c.  Resolving the Meaning of the PDJB 
It is now possible to plug in the left- and right-hand arguments to 
the semantic definition derived above to arrive at the linguistic mean-
ing of the PDJB.  Recall that the definition was: 
{ (X,Y ): X is derived from Y }. 
Plugging in the arguments derived above for X and Y provides: 
{ (action, public disclosure): action is derived from public disclo-
sure}. 
As can be seen, the PDJB “based upon” phrase directly relates the 
derivation of the action to the public disclosure, and not to the allega-
tions or transactions. 
Of course, all the foregoing linguistic analysis does no more than 
show that a natural English speaker’s intuition is correct.  Though it 
validates the Seventh Circuit’s pronouncement that its interpretation 
is in fact the plain-language interpretation, this analysis does not ad-
dress the argument noted by the Third Circuit that Congress was sim-
ply careless and intended the PDJB to be read either as regarding “the 
public disclosure of allegations or transactions” or “publicly disclosed 
allegations or transactions.”  While humans make innumerable minor 
linguistic mistakes in phrasing regularly, the distinction between these 
two phrases is so marked as to preclude any indifference on the draft-
ers’ part.  Consider the following minor adjustments to these phrases: 
1.  No court shall have jurisdiction over an action based upon 
the public disclosure of murder. 
2.  No court shall have jurisdiction over an action based upon 
publicly disclosed murder.95
The distinction between these two sentences should be clear to 
any native speaker of English—the first seems to be a valid act for the 
protection of witnesses to murders against charges going to their com-
ing forward; the second is a nonsensical license to commit murder, so 
long as the perpetrator subsequently announces her guilt.  That a leg-
95 Once again, my thanks to Professor David Pesetsky for these examples. 
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islature could possibly confuse the two—or intend that a statute stating 
the former could be read in either way—seems absurd. 
III. THE NONTEXTUAL RATIONALE FOR ADOPTING THE MINORITY RULE
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits’ reading of “based upon” in the 
FCA jurisdictional bar is in fact supported by linguistic evidence as the 
plain meaning of the statute.  The question, then, is whether the lin-
guistic evidence—and the fact of plain meaning—fully justifies the 
adoption of this reading by the Supreme Court.  Given the bar’s pur-
pose of preventing parasitic lawsuits while simultaneously encouraging 
whistleblowers,96 the Fourth and Seventh Circuits’ reading is sup-
ported both on linguistic and policy grounds, and it should be 
adopted. 
A resolution to the interpretation of the jurisdictional bar must 
incorporate treatment not only of the linguistic plain-language inter-
pretation, but also of the core policy behind the FCA and its jurisdic-
tional bar.  To this end, a full review of the various circuit opinions 
addressing the issue is in order. 
A.  The Majority Case 
Among the rationales advanced for adopting the majority rule by 
the various circuit courts are the good, the bad, and the ugly.97  The 
good reasons include the notions that the FCA contains “safeguards 
against [a] multiplicity of suits”98 regarding the same fraud, that a re-
strictive reading serves the needs of judicial economy,99 that finding 
more actions to be “based upon” public disclosures subjects them to 
the more important “original source” analysis,100 and that “[o]nce the 
96 See supra text accompanying notes 3-4. 
97 With apologies to Sergio Leone. 
98 Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 567 (11th Cir. 
1994).
99 As the Tenth Circuit explains, 
[A] more restrictive interpretation of “based upon” is consistent with practical 
considerations of judicial economy.  It is one thing to expect the court to 
evaluate the quantity and quality of information in the public domain versus 
that possessed by the qui tam plaintiff after trial for purposes of fee determina-
tion; it is quite another to expect a similar evaluation as part of a pre-trial ju-
risdictional inquiry. 
Precision, 971 F.2d at 553 (footnote omitted). 
100 Cooper, 19 F.3d at 568 n.10 (citing Precision, 971 F.2d at 552). 
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information is in the public domain, there is less need for a financial 
incentive to spur individuals into exposing frauds.”101
While the foregoing reasons are indeed good—that is, logically 
sound—there are countervailing reasons to adopt the minority inter-
pretation that tend to weigh more heavily.  As against the first reason, 
multiple suits stemming from the same fraud are not in fact prevented 
by the bar, so long as each qui tam litigant independently qualifies as 
an original source.102  Second, determining whether the plaintiff’s ac-
tion is “based upon” a public disclosure is surely not more difficult 
than determining whether the plaintiff is an “original source”—and 
indeed, it may reduce the number of cases in which such original-
source determinations need to be made.  It is thus unclear that judi-
cial economy is better served by the majority rule.  Third, it is substan-
tially unclear that the original-source determination is really more im-
portant than the “based upon” determination.103  Finally, the notion 
that whistleblowing becomes less efficient once information is in the 
public domain is flawed on three counts:  (1) the bar does not speak 
of information, but rather allegations and transactions;104 (2) the pub-
lic disclosure of allegations or transactions may not be readily or obvi-
ously attainable, even though public;105 and (3) this position is entirely 
backwards looking—it does not account for the dampening effect on 
101 United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 685 
(D.C. Cir. 1997). 
102 See United States ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 5 F.3d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 
1993) (“[T]here may be more than one original source eligible to bring suit . . . .”). 
103 The Eleventh Circuit cites to a House Judiciary Committee hearing in arguing 
that the original-source provision is intended to play a large role in preventing para-
sitic suits while encouraging legitimate whistleblowing.  Cooper, 19 F.3d at 568 n.10 (cit-
ing False Claims Act Implementation:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and 
Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 5 (1990) (statement 
of Sen. Charles Grassley)).  It is not clear, however, that Congress intended that the 
rest of the section be rendered subservient to that provision, or that Congress did not 
intend that both the “based upon” criteria and the original-source determination be 
used to that effect. 
104 This point is made in United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Railway. Co. v. 
Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1994), but the opinion misstates the law as 
“bar[ring] suits based on publicly disclosed ‘allegations or transactions,’ not informa-
tion,” converting the noun “disclosure” into the adjective “disclosed,” thereby obscur-
ing the provision’s meaning. 
105 See Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 14 F.3d at 655 (“Expertise in the field of engi-
neering would not in itself give a qui tam plaintiff the basis for suit when all the mate-
rial elements of fraud are publicly available, though not readily comprehensible to 
nonexperts.”). 
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future whistleblowers who may fear that their own actions will be pre-
empted by releases that they may not be able to predict or prevent.106
The lone “bad” reason used to justify the majority rule is that 
“[t]he [FCA] jurisdictional requirements are designed to restrict the 
number of persons who can bring qui tam actions and thereby avoid 
parasitic suits.”107  This reasoning is “bad” as a matter of logical reason-
ing:  reducing the number of potential litigants is not a surefire way of 
reducing abuse.  Consider a putative qui tam law that allows only the 
author of this Comment to bring qui tam actions.  In such a case, vir-
tually every qui tam action brought would be a parasitic action, in spite 
of the drastic reduction in the number of qui tam litigants. 
Finally, there is the “ugly” reason—ugly in the sense that it falls 
into the category of linguistic claims that cause legal-linguistics schol-
ars to shy away from linguistic decision making.108  It posits a bold-
faced lie about the plain meaning of the statute.  The assertion is that 
“[a]s a matter of common usage, the phrase ‘based upon’ is properly 
understood to mean ‘supported by.’”109  This construction of the 
phrase falls somewhere between the question at issue in the circuit 
split—the interpretation of “based upon”—and the question resolved 
by Rockwell—reliance in any part on public disclosure removes juris-
diction.  That is, the court confuses the question of what “based upon” 
means with whether an action can depend upon both public disclo-
106 It is possible, though perhaps far-fetched, to envision a case in which a poten-
tial qui tam plaintiff is about to “publicly disclose” information to the government 
when, by a sudden stroke of luck, the fraudulent actor discovers the whistleblower’s 
intent and moves immediately to disclose the information, thereby destroying the whis-
tleblower’s cause of action.  And, even in more pedestrian situations, the fear that part 
of the whistleblower’s claim depends upon some small piece of previously disclosed 
information—information that the whistleblower either does not at the outset know is 
public or does not know that she needs—may well deter her from coming forward.  
This is particularly true pursuant to Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, which 
destroys a whistleblower’s chance of recovery if her complaint, as amended, ever rests 
on public information.  127 S. Ct. 1397, 1408-09 (2007).  Most importantly, because 
the problem of fraud is ongoing, it is like a repeated game—and if potential whistle-
blowers choose their strategy based on the outcomes attained by other whistleblowers, 
these failures of the system will only serve to make future whistleblowers less forthcom-
ing. See generally DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 146-60 (1991) (de-
veloping the theory of repeated games with observable actions). 
107 United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 940 
(6th Cir. 1997). 
108 See SOLAN, supra note 29, at 176 (noting the judicial tendency to disguise judg-
ments made on other grounds as decisions forced by the language of the statute). 
109 United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552 (10th 
Cir. 1992).
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sures and independently obtained information.  Because the court 
does not contemplate the distinction between these questions, it is 
forced to invent a bizarre new definition for the phrase “based 
upon”—thus “supported by.” 
B.  The Minority Case 
The minority rule has been shown to be the plain meaning of the 
statute.  This “derived from” interpretation, however, has more to 
recommend it than syntax trees and semantic functions—it also im-
plements the statutory purpose. Considering the intent and purpose 
cited by virtually all of the circuit courts—“[s]eeking the golden mean 
between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders . . . and dis-
couragement of opportunistic plaintiffs”110—the minority rule is a fit-
ting interpretation of the law.  Further, if one adopts the textualist 
view that “[c]ongressional intent need be ascertained, if at all, from 
the plain language of the statute,”111 then the linguistic evidence pro-
vided in favor of the minority view bolsters its case still further.  In-
deed, it is hard to determine how the “derived from” interpretation 
could lead to an increase in parasitic lawsuits, while it is easy to see 
that it can encourage whistleblowing. 
Suppose, for example, that Willy Whistleblower wishes to expose 
the fraud of his employer, an insurance company, by using inside in-
formation that he has amassed for years.  Suppose that, not knowing 
how best to proceed, Willy takes his case to the federal official who 
handles his company’s account.112  On these facts, either of the two 
rules will allow Willy to bring action as an original source.113  Suppose 
110 United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 
(D.C. Cir. 1994). 
111 See, e.g., Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1997) (Farris, 
J., dissenting). 
112 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, L.L.C., 496 F.3d 730, 736 
(7th Cir. 2007) (“Disclosure of information to a competent public official about an al-
leged false claim against the government [is a] public disclosure . . . when the disclo-
sure is made to one who has managerial responsibility for the very claims being made.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Mathews v. Bank of Farmington, 
166 F.3d 853, 861 (7th Cir. 1999))), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1246 (2008). 
113 This illustration highlights the fallacy promoted by Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse 
Anesthetists v. Allina Health System Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1045 (8th Cir. 2002), discussed 
supra note 81, that the minority rule would render the original-source provision super-
fluous.  Indeed, it is clear that in this case Willy’s entire action is “derived from” the 
very allegations that Willy himself made public—that is, Willy brought allegations of 
fraud to the attention of the public and then proceeded to base a lawsuit off of those 
allegations.  The fact that Willy has independent knowledge of the facts underlying the 
954 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 923
that the situation is changed slightly, however, such that Willy is still in 
possession of all the same information, but some sufficient amount of 
that information114 is made public by the company a few days prior to 
Willy’s decision to act.  Under the minority rule, Willy’s cause of ac-
tion remains good:  he has not derived his suit from the public disclo-
sure of allegations or transactions, so jurisdiction remains.115  Under 
the majority interpretation, however, Willy is now out of luck:  his dili-
gent recordkeeping and secrecy have been rendered meaningless by 
the malfeasant company’s act.  Despite the fact that Willy is still in the 
best position to bring suit on behalf of the government—he has been 
collecting information for years, while the federal authorities have 
probably not even read about this situation in the news—he is barred 
because he did not “play some part in the original public disclosure of 
the allegations made in his suit.”116  This outcome seems wrong in two 
ways.  First, allowing the wrongdoer to prevent a whistleblower from 
profiting seems inequitable, and second, requiring potential whistle-
blowers to wade through all of the wrongdoer’s public disclosures 
prior to filing suit would probably strongly discourage such behav-
ior,117 in direct contradiction to the statutory purpose. 
On the other hand, consider the case of Otto Opportunist, who 
scours SEC reports and various other public records day by day in 
hope of uncovering a massive fraud being perpetrated right under the 
government’s nose.  Supposing that Otto has a better nose for funny 
business than the federal government, and he is able to stumble upon 
allegations made public does not bear on the case, as, pursuant to Rockwell’s reasoning, 
“[i]t is difficult to understand why Congress would care whether a relator knows about 
the information underlying a publicly disclosed allegation.”  Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. 
United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1407 (2007). 
114 That is, the company discloses information amounting to an “allegation or 
transaction” under the FCA—an amount at least equal to “X + Y,” the elements of a 
transaction, in the terminology of Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 14 F.3d at 653-54 (italics 
added).
115 Note that the additional Rockwell bar against claims based partially on publicly 
disclosed allegations is not triggered where the action is not “based upon” public dis-
closure of allegations, because the court does not need to enter into original-source 
determination at all.  Rockwell applies only to cases involving the original-source provi-
sion. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1401. 
116 Chen-Cheng Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing 
United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
117 It is difficult to see how potential whistleblowers are in a better position to 
make determinations about the “quantity and quality of information in the public do-
main versus that possessed by the qui tam plaintiff” when making such determinations 
is too taxing for the judicial economy to bear.  United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. 
Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 553 (10th Cir. 1992). 
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a scheme early enough to file suit before the local prosecutor, his suit 
will be barred under the minority rule just as it would under the ma-
jority rule.  In the case of Opportunist, so long as his information is 
drawn solely from the public record, any action that he files must nec-
essarily be actually derived from the public disclosure of allegations or 
transactions—there is simply no other way for him to obtain the nec-
essary information.  If, on the other hand, Otto decides to snoop 
around and uncovers fraud based on his own observation of nonpub-
lic activity (for example, if he discovers illegal pollution), then he is in 
the position of any other whistleblower:  he has information not in the 
public record and therefore should be encouraged by the FCA to 
bring suit.  As in the preceding example, Otto’s legitimate case based 
on his own investigation would be precluded by the majority rule, but 
his illegitimate case based on public data would not be saved by the 
minority rule.  Thus, any concern that the minority rule will be too lax 
seems unfounded—as does any expectation that the majority rule will 
bar more illegitimate claims.118
C.  Putting It Together 
The argument for the majority interpretation rests entirely on pol-
icy and imputed congressional intent, while the argument for the mi-
nority interpretation rests on policy, congressional intent, and linguis-
tics.  Taking these arguments into account, a future court should 
decide to adopt the minority interpretation as the more sound option.  
Indeed, most of the policy goals furthered by the majority rule are 
better achieved through the minority rule.119  Congressional intent, 
similarly, sits squarely in the corner of the minority rule, which does 
much more to encourage whistleblowing and is equally effective at de-
terring—or at least barring—parasitic suits.  The minority rule may 
indeed lead to more qui tam plaintiffs recovering a percentage of the 
government’s awards, which represents a significant cost to the gov-
ernment—but only when compared to a world in which the govern-
ment has the information to proceed without the help of whistleblow-
ers.  In the real world there is an economy of information, and 
118 Contra, e.g., United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 
F.3d 935, 940 (6th Cir. 1997) (arguing that the reduction in potential qui tam claimants 
because of the majority rule will necessarily reduce the number of illegitimate suits). 
119 The one exception, perhaps, is judicial economy, which will probably suffer 
from the allowance of more suits, as predicted by Precision, 971 F.2d at 553.  These in-
creased suits are the price of seeking to encourage parties to come forward, however, 
and it appears to be a price that Congress was willing to pay. 
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increasing incentives to information holders—potential whistleblow-
ers—serves to “make the pie higher.”120  Thus, if there is such a thing 
as the Laffer Curve121 for fraud recovery, it is embodied in the majority 
rule:  by attempting to secure more of the recovery revenue for the 
government, the rule destroys the incentive to create that revenue.  
The policy rationale for the minority rule, taken together with its 
faithfulness to the plain meaning of the statute, argues strongly for its 
adoption. 
CONCLUSION
If the question of interpreting the PDJB reaches the Supreme 
Court, the outcome will be difficult to guess.  Justice Alito has written 
in support of the majority rule in the past—he authored the opinion 
of the Third Circuit adopting the rule in that jurisdiction,122 and he 
expressed skepticism about the syntactic plain-language argument for 
the minority rule.123  His vote, however, cannot be considered firmly 
on the side of the majority, as his opinion in Mistick “agree[d] with the 
Fourth Circuit that in ordinary usage the phrase ‘based upon’ is not 
generally used to mean ‘supported by.’”124  Further complicating mat-
ters, the plain-meaning interpretation of the minority rule tends to in-
crease the number of potential qui tam litigants, which cuts against 
the views of those Justices otherwise amenable to plain-language ar-
guments.125  The PDJB would not be the first question on which the 
120 Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., Political Tongue Twisters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2000, at A17 
(quoting then-presidential candidate George W. Bush).  The more common phrase, of 
course, is to “make the pie larger.” 
121 See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Time, and the Laffer Curve,
90 J. POL. ECON. 816, 817-18 (1982) (describing the Laffer Curve’s posited inverse rela-
tion between tax rates and revenue). 
122 United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth., 186 F.3d 376, 388 (3d Cir. 1999). 
123 See id. (finding the PDJB’s language “syntactically ambiguous”). 
124 Id. at 386. 
125 For instance, Justice Scalia authored the opinion in Rockwell, which significantly 
limited the scope of the original-source exception to the jurisdictional bar. 
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otherwise textualist justices sided against linguistic evidence,126 but it 
would certainly be one of the most clearly unambiguous cases.127
126 Indeed, Justice Scalia “think[s] it not contrary to sound principles of interpre-
tation, in . . . extreme cases, to give the totality of context precedence over a single 
word.”  Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
3, 20-21 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
127 Justice Alito has, however, already clearly sided against linguistic evidence by 
contending that careless structural choice led to syntactic ambiguity in the PDJB.  See
Mistick, 186 F.3d at 388; supra text accompanying note 95. 
